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WHO OWNS THE BED OF
LAKE MICHIGAN?
CLIFTON WILLIANIS*
A TITLE to land, especially in this country, is a very mythical
thing. We have learned not to investigate back of a certain
point when we are examining a title to the so-called "up-land," but
if a question arises on title to submerged land, because of the in-
frequency of such cases, we are inclined to look into the proposition
a little farther.
Having represented the City of Milwaukee in a recent case' in-
volving the right of the city to fill in about ninety acres in Lake
Michigan, under a grant from the legislature, and trade most of this
filled in land to a private corporation for some land on the shore,
the writer, of necessity, was compelled to "go to the bottom of the
proposition." It may be interesting to state ahead of any discussion
of the law that an abstract of title to the bottom of Lake Michigan,
reading backwards, is about as follows: State of Wisconsin from
the United States Government, where it was held in trust at the time
of the organization of the Northwest Territory; United States in trust
from the State of Virginia; Virginia by private grant from the King
of England.
Now the interesting question comes up: Where did the King of
England get it? We will support our answer to that question in a
moment by some decisions of the supreme court of the United States,
but here is the story. Some subjects of the king "discovered" it
(although the Indians were here and well organized). These subjects,
according to international law, recognized their allegiance to the king.
That gave the king of England the title-not only to the upland but
to the bed of all navigable water.
Now following the title to the bed of Lake Michigan down from
that source it reads as follows: King of England by private grant to
Virginia; Virginia in trust to the United States Government, on March
I, 1784, for states to be carved out of the Northwest Territory;
eventually Wisconsin was made up of part of this Northwest Territory,
and when it came into existence as a state it got the fee simple title to
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the bed of Lake Michigan, to the middle line thereof, and to all other
navigable lakes and rivers within the state. That completed the trust,
and the title is a fee.
The very interesting and important case of Martin v. Waddell,
2
and other cases of its kind, some of which will be mentioned herein,
operate as a sort of a quieting title process. The case just mentioned
was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States at the
January term, 1841, and decided during the January term of 1842.
It was an ejectment suit involving 15o acres of land covered by the
navigable water in Raritan Bay in the township of Perth Amboy in
the State of New Jersey. The defendant claimed under a direct line
of grant under the charter granted by Charles II to his brother, the
Duke of York. The plaintiff claimed under a title granted by the
State of New Jersey more than twenty-five years after the Revolution-
ary WYar. In an ejectment suit the plaintiff must win on the strength
of his own title and not on the weakness of the defendant's; but both
titles are discussed at length in the opinion. As a part of the discus-
sion of the defendant's title the following very interesting quotation
appears:
The English possessions in America were not claimed by right of
conquest, but by right of discovery. For according to the principles
of international law, as then understood by the civilized powers of
Europe, the Indian tribes in the new world were regarded as mere
temporary occupants of the soil, and the absolute rights of property
and dominion were held to belong to the European nation by which
any particular portion of the country was first discovered.
Mr. Chief Justice Taney finally disposed of that analysis of the
defendant's title by stating:
We do not propose to meddle with the point.
Speaking of the plaintiff's title the court states:
For when the Revolution took place the people of each state be-
came themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute
right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their
own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the
Constitution to the general government.
The code pleader sees a defect of parties. The Indians were not in
the Revolutionary War as far as we have ever been able to find.
Nevertheless, this case quieted the title to the land involved, in the
State of New Jersey, and since the plaintiff held under grant from
the state, the plaintiff won. That was the first case of any importance
involving title to submerged land in the Supreme Court o.f ,the" United
2i6 Peters 366. 
.,
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States. There had been earlier cases in New York growing out of
grants in the Hudson River by the State of New York as early as
1807.
In that year in the case of Jacobson v. Fountain,3 we find the Su-
preme Court of the State of New York giving judgment to a plaintiff
for $4oo damages because the defendant had trespassed upon and fished
in waters over land which had been granted to the plaintiff's predeces-
sors.
A similar result happened in 1817 in Brink et al. v. Richtinyer.4
In 1829 in the case of Lansing v. Smith,5 we find the Court for
the Correction of Errors in the State of New York, being the senate
presided over by the chancellor, going fully into the history of the
common law and into the strength of a private grant of land under
the navigable water in the Hudson River; but it was not until 1842
that the matter really got into the Supreme Court of the United States.
Subsequently, in 1845, in the case of Pollard et ul. v. Hagan,6 for
the first time, a contest was waged in the Supreme Court of the
United States to definitely settle whether or not the state or the Federal
Government, in fact, had the fee simple title to land submerged under
navigable water. In that case the following question was involved:
When Alabama came into the Union in i818, consisting of land in
some ways affected by the Spanish-Florida Treaty and in other ways
affected by the Louisiana Treaty with France, did the Federal Govern-
ment get title to the submerged land in Mobile Bay and retain it, or
did the state get the title when it became a member of the Union?
It was finally held that Alabama came into the Union on the same
footing as the original states, being carved out of land ceded to the
United States by Georgia on April 24, i8o2, which deed contained the
same kind of language that was contained in the deed of cession exe-
cuted by Virginia, conveying the Northwest Territory land, on March
I, 1784. And then it was held that by these cessions the United States
accepted the territory in trust for the new states, and when the new
states were organized, the sovereignty, and the soil under the navi-
gable water went to the new states, while the upland was retained by
the Federal Government for the purpose of sale to raise revenue for
the new Federal Government, which was then practically bankrupt.
The deed of cession by Virginia on March I, 1784, affecting the en-
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For the benefit of said states to be formed all right, title and claim
as well of soil as of jurisdiction which this commonwealth hath to the
territorial tract of country within the limits of the Virginia charter,
situate, lying and being to the northwest of the river Ohio ....
When Wisconsin adopted her constitution in 1848, in section 2
of article IX she accepted this trust title fully and completely. The
section reads as follows:
The title to all lands and other property which have accrued to
the territory of Wisconsin by grant, gift, purchase, forfeiture, escheat
or otherwise shall vest in the State of Wisconsin.
The instrument of cession from Virginia, mentioned above, shows
that the Federal Government was to have the right to sell off the
upland for the use and benefit of the United States, but that stipulation
did not apply to the submerged land.
The same theory and the same law was applied even to the State
of California where the title came in from Mexico. The point was first
raised in Webber v. The Board of State Harbor Commissioners.7 It
is pointed out in that case that California came into the Union on an
equal footing with the original states. Consequently the title to the
submerged land thereby vested, not in the Federal Government, but
in the State of California as soon as it became a state. The State of
California deeded important parts of the San Francisco Bay to the
City of San Francisco, and San Francisco conveyed to private owners.
The leading case on the subject seems to be Shivley v. Bowlby.8 That
case went to the extreme of holding that the State of Oregon could
sell off the submerged land in the Columbia River between the riparian
owner and the portion of the stream which was navigable, in fact.
Possibly the most interesting case on the subject is the case of
United States v. Mission Rock Company. It followed the case of
Shivley v. Bowiby in point of time, but the facts are more unique.
In San Francisco Bay two stony islands protruded above the surface
of the water several feet, although they were not included in the
government survey of the upland in the district. Around these islands
is considerable shallow water. The State of California.deeded the land
under this shallow water to a ship building company, the grantor of
the defendant in the suit. The ship building company had spent over
three hundred thousand dollars in building dry docks and other ship
building equipment. On January 3, 1899, President McKinley issued
an -executive order declaring these islands, which were then known
as Mission Rocks, to be reserved for naval purposes. The United
7 i8 Wall, 57, 21 L. Ed. 798.
a 152 U.S. I, 38 L Ed. 331, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 548.
'U.S. 392, 47 L. Ed. 865.
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States then brought suit against the ?vlission Rock Company for eject-
ment and damages. The Supreme Court of the United States held
that although the uplands of the islands were not included in the
original government survey maps, they nevertheless belonged to the
Federal Government, in fact, and that the Federal Government should
prevail as to that portion of the lawsuit because it was a physical fact
that the land must have been upland at the time of the survey; but
that the submerged lands and the land below high water mark had
belonged to the State of California in fee and that the state could
grant a fee to the grantor of the defendant, and the Federal Govern-
ment lost the case as to the submerged land.
A similar case is the case of United States v. Chandler-D unbar
Water Power Company," involving an island in St. Mary's River in
Michigan.
The doctrine was repeated in the case of Scott v. Lattig, 1n involving
an island in the Snake River between Idaho and Oregon, the court
holding that the vegetation on the island showed that it must have been
there at the time of the survey, although omitted, and must have been
upland at that time and consequently did not belong to the abutting
owner, but the portion on the Idaho side of the center of the stream
could be sold off by the Federal Government because it was upland,
while the portion which was clearly underneath the navigable water
could be disposed of by the state, subject, of course, to the paramount
rights of navigation. The government navigation rights are conclu-
sively waived when the War Department grants a permit for any
improvement that may be made upon land that is legitimately conveyed
by the states.
A discussion of this kind of title which is vested in the states, and
the power of the state to convey, would not be complete without a
reference to the case of Illinois Central Railway Company v. Illinois,12
and the second appearance of the case in the Supreme Court of the
United States at 184 U.S. 77. Anyone familiar with the geography
of Chicago will recognize the situation. There was a grant by the
State of Illinois of the submerged land along the shore of Lake
Michigan, where the Illinois Central tracks are now located and where
the Illinois Central depot has been erected. The final outcome of this
litigation was that the State of Illinois could make this grant to the
railway company, and that the railway company could fill in out to
the point of navigation, which was then a seventeen foot depth of
water. This case definitely established the "parcel doctrine" in the
10209 U.S. 447, 52 L. Ed. 881.
"227 U.S. 229, 57 L. Ed. 490.
12 146 U.S. 387, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. iio.
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United States-that is, a state may grant a parcel of a harbor to
private interests and if the Federal Government will grant a permit
for construction work the rights of the public are entirely foreclosed.
This theory was followed in the Lincoln Park cases litigated through
the Illinois Supreme Court, where the filled in land was used, boldly,
for park purposes, which are in no way incident to navigation. Several
of these park cases have gone to the Supreme Court of Illinois, but
none have gone to the Supreme Court of the United States.
It is now clearly established in Wisconsin that the state owns the
title under the waters of the lakes and may grant to private persons
so long as the grant does not interfere with navigation beyond a
point approved by the Federal Government. Mysteriously we have
adopted a different doctrine with reference to navigable streams. With-
out any act of the legislature the Wisconsin Supreme Court holds, since
an early date, that the riparian owner holds to the thread of navigable
rivers in the state. An interesting problem will arise near the mouth
of some river some day where the river tapers into a navigable lake.
It will be impossible to follow the title of the abutting owner down the
thread of the stream and then watch it disappear into the lake, where
the state, undeniably, now, owns the submerged land.
It would be very interesting indeed to see an attempted plat of the
ownership along the shore of the Wolf River, then where it tapers
into Poygan Lake, and then on down where Poygan Lake narrows
into Butte des Morts (which may be a river and may be a lake) and
then following on down to where there is undoubtedly a short stretch
of Wolf River again, just before we reach Lake Winnebago. It
will be especially interesting to take some abutting owner where one
of these bodies tapers into the other, and try to figure out the bound-
ary line of ownership on the water side.
